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THE TIME CONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL MONETARY
AND FISCAL POLICIES
BY FERNANDO ALVAREZ, PATRICK J. KEHOE, AND
PABLO ANDRÉS NEUMEYER1
We show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for a class
of economies often used in applied work, economies appealing because they are con-
sistent with the growth facts. We establish our results in two steps. We first show that
for this class of economies, the Friedman rule of setting nominal interest rates to zero
is optimal under commitment. We then show that optimal policies are time consistent
if the Friedman rule is optimal. For our benchmark economy in which the time con-
sistency problem is most severe, the converse also holds: if optimal policies are time
consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal.
KEYWORDS: Friedman rule, maturity structure, time inconsistency, sustainable
plans.
A CLASSIC ISSUE IN MACROECONOMICS is whether or not optimal monetary
and fiscal policies are time consistent. In a monetary economy, Calvo (1978)
shows that the incentive for the government to inflate away its nominal liabil-
ities leads to a time consistency problem for optimal policies. In a real econ-
omy, Lucas and Stokey (1983) show that the incentive for the government to
devalue its real debt typically also leads to a time consistency problem for op-
timal policies. They show that, with a carefully chosen maturity structure for
real government debt, optimal policies can be made time consistent in a real
economy. But they conjecture that the analogous result does not hold for a
monetary economy with both nominal and real debt. Contrary to their conjec-
ture, we show that for a class of monetary economies typically used in applied
work, optimal policies are time consistent.
Our benchmark model is an infinite horizon model with end-of-period
money balances in the utility function of the representative consumer. In this
model, the government has access to nominal and real debt of all maturities
and must finance a given stream of government expenditures with a combina-
tion of consumption taxes and seigniorage. Following Lucas and Stokey (1983),
we abstract from the well-understood problems arising from capital taxation by
not including any kind of capital. We also discuss variations of our model, such
as those with beginning-of-period balances in the utility function as well as
cash-credit economies and shopping time economies.
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We establish our result in two steps. We first show that for a class of mone-
tary economies typically used in applied work, the optimal policy under com-
mitment is the Friedman rule of setting the nominal interest rate to zero. We
then show that if the Friedman rule is optimal under commitment in such
economies, then the optimal policy is time consistent. For the benchmark econ-
omy, we also show the converse, that if the optimal policy is time consistent,
then the Friedman rule is optimal under commitment.
Our approach to the issue of time consistency is basically that of Lucas and
Stokey (1983). To establish our benchmark for optimal policy, we begin by
solving for Ramsey policies, namely, the optimal policies in an environment
in which the initial government has a commitment technology that binds the
actions of future governments. In this environment, therefore, the initial gov-
ernment chooses policy once and for all. Ramsey policies here consist of se-
quences of consumption taxes and money supplies.
We then turn to the environment of interest, in which no such commitment
technology exists. Here each government inherits a maturity structure of nom-
inal and real debt and decides on the current setting for the consumption tax
and the money supply, as well as on the maturity structure of nominal and
real debt that its successor will inherit. We ask whether a maturity structure
of government debt can be chosen so that all governments carry out the Ram-
sey policies. If it can, we say that the Ramsey policies are time consistent, or
equivalently, that the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
We find that if the Ramsey policies are to be time consistent, then the struc-
ture of the nominal bonds which a government in a particular time period
leaves to its successor in the next period must be severely restricted. One of
these restrictions is well understood: the present value of these nominal claims
must be zero. If this present value is positive, then the successor will inflate
the nominal claims away by setting the price level to be very high, while if the
present value is negative, then the successor will make its claims on the public
large by setting the price level to be very low.
In this sort of environment, if the Ramsey policies are to be time consistent,
the government in any period must be able to induce its successor to carry
out its plan even with these restrictions. The restrictions constrain the ability
of any government to influence its successor primarily through the maturity
structure of the real bonds. When the Friedman rule is optimal, consumers are
satiated with money balances, and no seigniorage is raised—as if money has
disappeared—so that the economy is equivalent to a real economy with one
consumption good and labor. For such a real economy, we can use the same
scheme for the maturity structure of real debt that Lucas and Stokey (1983) use
to show that optimal policy is time consistent. We show that this result holds
for our benchmark economy as well as some other commonly used monetary
economies.
We argue that economies for which the Friedman rule is optimal—and,
hence, those for which optimal policies are time consistent—are of applied
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interest. This is because the preferences in these economies are the most fre-
quently used in the applied literature. An appealing feature of them is that
they are consistent with the growth facts.
For our benchmark economy, we also prove the converse of our main result:
if the optimal policy is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal under
commitment. A critical step in proving this result is uncovering some subtle
extra restrictions on nominal debt: if the Friedman rule does not hold in some
period, then the present value of nominal bonds from that period on must be
zero. In general, the government in any period is so restricted in influencing its
successor that it cannot induce the government to carry out the continuation
of its plan.
One way to get some intuition for our results is to count instruments and
policies in a finite horizon version of our economy in a manner reminiscent of
that of Tinbergen (1956). The basic idea is that in order for a government’s
policies to be time consistent, the government must have at least as many in-
struments of influence on its successor as its successor has policy choices. In
particular, the period 0 government must have at least as many instruments
as the period 1 government has policy choices. In a T-period economy, the
period 1 government chooses 2T policies—the T taxes on consumption and
the T taxes on real balances. The extra restrictions on nominal debt discussed
above imply that the period 0 government has effectively only the T real bonds
as instruments to influence the period 1 government. When the Friedman rule
is optimal, consumers are satiated with money, and at the associated alloca-
tion, a small variation in interest rates has no effect on revenues. In this sense,
money effectively disappears, and the period 1 government has only T policies.
Hence, the period 0 government has sufficiently many instruments to induce its
successor to carry out its plan, and the solution to the Ramsey problem is time
consistent for period 1. A similar argument holds for other periods. When the
Friedman rule is not optimal, the period 0 government does not have enough
instruments to induce its successor to carry out its plan, and thus, the solution
to the Ramsey problem is not time consistent.
For most of this study, we follow the original approach to time consistency
used by Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) in order to highlight the
relation between our results and the earlier literature in the most transparent
way. We also relate this approach to the approaches of sustainable plans used
by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and credible policies used by Stokey (1991). Those
approaches explicitly build the government’s lack of commitment into the en-
vironment with an equilibrium concept in which governments explicitly think
through how their choices of debt influence their successors’ choices. We show
that optimal policies are time consistent if and only if they are supportable as
a Markov sustainable equilibrium. Relating the concepts of time consistency
and sustainable plans is of interest in itself.
Our study is related to that of Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987). They
argue that with a sufficiently rich term structure of both nominal and real
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government debt, optimal policies can be made time consistent regardless of
whether or not the Friedman rule is satisfied. Unfortunately, their result is not
true. Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) sketch a variational argument which suggests
that the solution proposed by Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) is not
time consistent. Calvo and Obstfeld conjecture that the mistake of those re-
searchers is that their proposed solution violates the second-order conditions.
We formalize the Calvo–Obstfeld conjecture here and precisely characterize
the conditions under which it applies. We find that the mistake of Persson,
Persson, and Svensson has less to do with second-order conditions than with a
lack of attention to endogenous restrictions on the nominal debt that a govern-
ment can leave to its successor. More importantly, unlike Calvo and Obstfeld,
we conclude that Ramsey policies are time consistent for an interesting set of
economies.
1. THE RAMSEY PROBLEM AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE
We start by constructing our benchmark economy, describing its Ramsey
problem, and demonstrating the conditions under which the Friedman rule is
optimal in this economy. In so doing, we extend the results in the literature
to a somewhat broader class of environments. We show that for preferences
commonly used in applied work, the Friedman rule is optimal. These prefer-
ences are attractive because they are consistent with balanced growth. We also
describe restrictions on government debt that are necessary for the existence
of an interior solution to the Ramsey problem in this economy.
The Benchmark Economy
Consider an economy with money, nominal government debt, and real gov-
ernment debt. Time is discrete. The resource constraint is given by
ct + gt = lt(1)
where ct gt , and lt denote consumption, government spending, and labor in
time period t. Throughout, the sequence of government spending is exoge-
nously given.
In this economy, consumers have preferences over sequences of consump-
tion ct , real money balances mt , and labor lt given by
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ctmt lt)(2)
with the discount factor 0 < β < 1, where mt = Mt/pt is defined as end-of-
period nominal money balances Mt divided by the nominal price level pt . We
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assume that the period utility function U(cm l) is concave, twice continu-
ously differentiable, increasing in c, and decreasing in l. We also assume that
consumers are satiated at a finite level of real balances, so that for each value
of c and l, there is a finite level of m such that Um(cm l) = 0, where here
and throughout, we let Um and Umm denote the partial derivatives ∂U/∂m and
∂2U/∂m2, respectively. We use analogous notation for other partial derivatives
throughout.
In terms of assets, we assume that the government issues both nominal and
real bonds for every maturity. For the nominal bonds, for each period t and
s with t ≤ s, we let Qts denote the price of one dollar in period s in units of
dollars in period t, and we let Bts denote the number of such nominal bonds.
Similarly, for the real bonds, we let qts denote the price of one unit of con-
sumption in period s in units of consumption in period t and let bts denote the
number of such real bonds. We let Bt = (Btt+1Btt+2   ) denote the vector
of nominal bonds purchased by consumers in t which pay off Bts in s for all
s ≥ t + 1. We use similar notation for the real bonds bt and the nominal and
real debt prices Qt and qt . For later use, note that arbitrage among these bonds
implies that for all t ≤ r ≤ s, their prices satisfy Qts =QtrQrs , qts = qtrqrs, and
Qts = qtspt/ps. By convention, Qtt = 1 and qtt = 1.
Each consumer’s sequence of budget constraints in period t can be written as
pt(1 + τt)ct +Mt +
∞∑
s=t+1
QtsBts +pt
∞∑
s=t+1
qtsbts(3)
= ptlt +Mt−1 +
∞∑
s=t
QtsBt−1s +pt
∞∑
s=t
qtsbt−1s
Thus, in period t, each consumer has a nominal wage income of ptlt , nominal
money balances Mt−1, a vector of nominal bonds Bt−1, and a vector of real
bonds bt−1. Consumers purchase consumption ct , new money balances Mt , and
new vectors of nominal bonds Bt and real bonds bt . Purchases of consumption
are taxed at the rate τt . In period 0, consumers have initial money balances
M−1, together with initial vectors of nominal and real bonds B−1 and b−1. We
assume that in each period, the real values of both nominal and real bonds,
or debt, purchased are bounded by a constant. This constant can be chosen
sufficiently large so that the constraint does not bind.
For convenience, we will work with the consumers’ problem in period 0 form.
The sequence of budget constraints (3) can be collapsed to the period 0 budget
constraint:
∞∑
t=0
q0t[(1 + τt)ct + (1 −Qtt+1)mt](4)
=
∞∑
t=0
q0t lt + M−1
p0
+
∞∑
t=0
Q0t
B−1t
p0
+
∞∑
t=0
q0tb−1t 
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We can interpret the term (1 −Qtt+1)mt as the effective tax on real balances
paid by consumers. Notice that this effective tax is positive when Qtt+1 < 1
and zero when Qtt+1 = 1. The consumers’ problem in period 0 is to choose
sequences of consumption, real balances, and labor to maximize (2) subject
to (4).
In period t, the government inherits the nominal money Mt−1, the nominal
debt vector Bt−1, and the real debt vector bt−1. To finance government spending
gt , the government collects consumption taxes τtct and issues new money Mt ,
new nominal debt Bt , and new real debt bt . The government’s sequence of bud-
get constraints is analogous to that of the consumer. We collapse this constraint
into the period 0 budget constraint:
∞∑
t=0
q0t[τtct +(1−Qtt+1)mt −gt] = M−1
p0
+
∞∑
t=0
Q0t
B−1t
p0
+
∞∑
t=0
q0tb−1t(5)
We use the notation t c = (ct ct+1   ) for consumption and similar notation
for real balances, labor, prices, and taxes. For given initial conditions M−1, B−1,
and b−1, then, a period 0 competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences
of consumption, real balances, and labor (0c, 0m, 0l) together with sequences
of prices (0p, Q0, q0) and taxes 0τ that satisfy the resource constraint in each
period and consumer maximization. The government budget constraint is then
implied.
In any equilibrium, nominal interest rates are nonnegative, so that the one-
period bond price Qtt+1 = 1 + (Umt/Ult) ≤ 1. Since Ult < 0, for interest rates
to be nonnegative, the marginal utility of money must satisfy
Umt ≥ 0(6)
which we refer to as the nonnegative interest rate constraint. As is well known,
the allocations in a competitive equilibrium are characterized by three sim-
ple conditions: the resource constraint (1), the nonnegative interest rate con-
straint (6), and the implementability constraint,
∞∑
t=0
βtR(ctmt lt)= −Ul0
p0
(
M−1 +
∞∑
t=0
Q0tB−1t
)
−
∞∑
t=0
βtUltb−1t(7)
where R(ctmt lt) = ctUct + mtUmt + ltUlt is the government surplus τtct +
(1 − Qtt+1)mt − gt expressed in marginal utility units and Q0t = t−1s=0[1 +
(Ums/Uls)]. This implementability constraint should be thought of as the pe-
riod 0 budget constraint of either the consumers or the government, where the
consumers’ first-order conditions have been used to substitute out prices and
policies.
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The Ramsey Problem
Given the initial conditions M−1B−1, and b−1, the Ramsey problem in pe-
riod 0 is to choose 0c, 0m, 0l, and p0 to maximize consumers’ utility (2) subject
to the economy’s resource constraint (1) for all t, the nonnegative interest rate
constraint (6) for all t, and the implementability constraint (7).
Our results will depend critically on whether or not the allocations that solve
this problem satisfy the Friedman rule, in that Qtt+1 = 1, for all t, so that nom-
inal interest rates are zero in every period. Since Qtt+1 = 1 + (Umt/Ult) and
Ult < 0, the Friedman rule holds if and only if Umt = 0, for all t.
We now discuss the initial conditions for both nominal and real government
debt that we choose for the Ramsey problem. To make the problem interesting,
we want initial conditions for which distortionary taxes are necessary. A suffi-
cient condition for this to be true is that in each period t, the sum of govern-
ment spending and its real initial debt maturing in period t is positive. That
is, gt + b−1t ≥ 0 for all t with strict inequality for some t. We assume that this
condition holds throughout.
The solution to the Ramsey problem also depends critically on the struc-
ture of the value of the government’s initial nominal liabilities—the initial
money supply M−1 and the vector of initial nominal debt B−1—through the
term −Ul0(M−1 +∑∞t=0 Q0tB−1t)/p0 in the implementability constraint. The
term (M−1 +∑∞t=0 Q0tB−1t) is the present value of the government’s nominal
liabilities in units of dollars in period 0. Dividing by p0 converts this value into
period 0 consumption good units, and multiplying by −Ul0 converts the result
into units of period 0 utility.
We assume that initial nominal government liabilities are all zero, in that
M−1 +B−10 = 0 and B−1t = 0 for all t ≥ 1(8)
Under (8), the present value of nominal liabilities in (7) is identically equal to
zero, and the Ramsey problem is independent of p0.
The Friedman Rule
In the next section, we will show that the Ramsey problem is time consistent
if and only if the Friedman rule is optimal in each period. Here we establish
sufficient conditions for the Friedman rule to be optimal in each period in an
economy that satisfies (8).
If we let γt , ηt , and λ0 denote the multipliers on the resource constraint (1),
the nonnegative interest rate constraint (6), and the implementability con-
straint (7), then for t ≥ 1, the first-order conditions for ct , mt , and lt are
Uct + λ0(Rct + b−1tUlct)+ηtUmct + λ0Ul0
p0
Qctt+1
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt+1sB−1s = γt(9)
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Umt +λ0(Rmt +b−1tUlmt)+ηtUmmt + λ0Ul0
p0
Qmtt+1
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt+1sB−1s = 0(10)
Ult +λ0(Rlt + b−1tUllt)+ηtUmlt + λ0Ul0
p0
Qltt+1
∞∑
s=t+1
Qt+1sB−1s = −γt(11)
where Qts = sr=t[1 + (Umr/Ulr)] and where Qitt+1 are the derivatives of
1 + (Umt/Ult) with respect to i = cm l. For t = 0, we add λ0Ulc0(M−1 +∑∞
t=0 Q0tB−1t )/p0 to the left side of (9) and analogous terms to (10) and (11).
Finally, the first-order condition for the initial price level is
−λ0Ul0
p20
(
M−1 +B−10 +
∞∑
t=1
Q0tB−1t
)
= 0(12)
We can use these first-order conditions to establish circumstances under
which the Friedman rule is optimal. Consider an economy with preferences
that are separable and homothetic, in that U(cm l)= u(w(cm) l), where the
function w is homothetic in c and m and for which initial nominal government
liabilities are all zero. Preferences that are separable and homothetic include
commonly used preferences in monetary models like U = w(cm)1−σv(l)/
(1 − σ), where w is homogeneous of degree one. Such preferences are con-
sistent with some basic facts of economic growth: hours worked per person
have been approximately constant, and consumption, real balances, and in-
come have grown at approximately the same rate. (See the work of Lucas
(2000).) The following proposition, proved in the Appendix, is related to but
not covered by the results of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996).
PROPOSITION 1: If preferences are separable and homothetic and the initial
nominal government liabilities are all zero, then the Friedman rule is optimal.
Again, many preferences commonly used in applied work are covered by
Proposition 1. Sometimes, however, applied work uses nonseparable homo-
thetic preferences. In Proposition 2, we show that the Friedman rule is also
optimal for such preferences as long as at the point of satiation, real balances
and leisure are Pareto substitutes, in the sense that Uml ≥ 0. This proposition
uses a much weaker form of homotheticity than Proposition 1:
Um(αcαm l)
Uc(αcαm l)
= Um(cm l)
Uc(cm l)
(13)
for any positive α, which implies that real balances and consumption grow at
the same rate along a balanced growth path. Notice that the case in which
Uml > 0 at the point where Um = 0 corresponds to the case in which the non-
negativity constraint on interest rates binds at the Friedman rule.
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PROPOSITION 2: Assume that initial nominal government liabilities are all zero
and that Uml ≥ 0 whenever Um = 0. If preferences are consistent with balanced
growth in the sense of (13), then the Friedman rule solves the Ramsey problem.
In the proof, given in the Appendix, we show that if Uml ≥ 0 and preferences
are consistent with balanced growth, then we can construct a feasible alloca-
tion and nonnegative multipliers that satisfy the first-order conditions and the
implementability condition. We obtain this allocation by solving the Ramsey
problem for a corresponding real economy without money. This real economy
has utility function U¯(c l) = U(cm∗(c l) l) where m∗(c l) is the satiation
level of money balances so that Um(cm∗ l) = 0. The constructed allocation
solves the Ramsey problem in the monetary economy because it is as if money
has disappeared in that economy: consumers are satiated with money, seignior-
age is zero, and Rm = 0, so that the marginal effect on revenues from a change
in real balances is zero.
An immediate application of this proposition lets us extend our results to
cash-credit and shopping time economies. Also, the proposition is related to,
but not covered by, the results of Correia and Teles (1999).
Propositions 1 and 2 cover many preferences commonly used in applied
work. These preferences are chosen to be consistent with the growth facts. For
the sake of completeness, note that not all preferences that satisfy the growth
facts imply that the Friedman rule is optimal. In particular, preferences such as
U = c1−σv(m/c l)/(1 − σ) satisfy balanced growth, but with them the Fried-
man rule is not optimal if v12/v11 > 0. For such preferences, Uml is negative at
Um = 0.
Endogenous Restrictions on Nominal Debt Left to Future Governments
In the next section, we will carefully define our notion of time consistency.
The intuitive idea is that for each period t, the period t government must be
able to leave vectors of nominal and real debt to its successor, the period t + 1
government, so that the successor has the incentive to carry out the contin-
uation of the plan of the period t government. Under our assumptions, the
Ramsey problem in period 0 will entail an interior solution for pt+1 for all t.
Thus, for any vector of nominal debt left to a government at t + 1 to be part
of a time consistent solution, the successor government must, having inherited
such a vector, choose an interior solution for the price level pt+1. Here we de-
velop necessary restrictions on initial nominal debt vectors for such an interior
solution to exist.
In the lemma below, we show that the necessary restrictions for an interior
solution to exist are that if the Friedman rule does not hold in some period,
then from that period on, the present value of nominal debt must be zero.
Although useful in the analysis of time consistency, the lemma is simply about
the type of restrictions that initial nominal debt vectors must satisfy in order
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for an interior solution to a Ramsey problem to exist. (We use this lemma later
in Proposition 4, when we develop some necessary conditions for the solution
to a Ramsey problem to be time consistent.)
For notational simplicity, we focus on the restrictions that the nominal debt
inherited by the period 0 government must satisfy; the same logic applies to any
period t. (Of course, for the period 0 government, the inherited debt is part of
the environment, while for any period t government with t ≥ 1, the inherited
debt is part of the endogenous construction of a potentially time consistent
plan. Regardless, the lemma applies to any period t ≥ 0)
Clearly, for the Ramsey problem in period 0 to have an interior solution for
p0 (that is, for 0 <p0 <∞), M−1 and B−1 must satisfy the condition that
M−1 +
∞∑
t=0
Q0tB−1t = 0(14)
This condition, however, is not enough to eliminate the nominal forces that
lead to the nonexistence of an interior solution. We show that the following
stronger conditions are necessary. If in some period s, the Friedman rule does
not hold, so that Qss+1 < 1, then the present value of government debt from
period s + 1 on must be zero, so that
0 =
∞∑
t=s+1
Q0tB−1t =Q0sQss+1
∞∑
t=s+1
Qs+1tB−1t (15)
Given our assumptions on gt +bt , there must be some period—say, r—in which
consumption taxes are being levied, so that −Ucr/Ulr = 1 + τr > 1. We will
assume that in this period r, the second derivatives satisfy the conditions that
Umm +Ulm < 0 if Um > 0 Ull +Ulc ≥ 0 and Umc +Uml ≥ 0(16)
The following lemma determines restrictions that inherited nominal debt must
satisfy for an interior solution to that government’s problem to exist.
LEMMA: Assume that an interior solution to the Ramsey problem in period 0
with 0 < p0 < ∞ exists, that there is some period s in which the Friedman rule
does not hold, that there is some period r in which consumption taxes are levied,
and that in period r the conditions (16) hold. Then the value of initial nominal
government debt from s + 1 on is zero, so that (15) holds.
The proof of the lemma (provided in the Appendix) is rather intricate and
is related to the informal variational argument suggested by Calvo and Obst-
feld (1990). We summarize it here. The proof proceeds by contradiction. We
suppose that at the solution, the Friedman rule does not hold, and the present
value of the nominal government liabilities from period 0 on is zero, but the
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present value from period t on is not zero. We then show that no such solution
can exist by constructing an alternative allocation that gives higher utility. In
the construction, we perturb the original allocation in two steps. The first step
is a small variation in nominal interest rates, which may entail lowering them.
This variation will make the present value from period 0 on strictly negative,
so that the consumers owe the government some nominal amount. Once the
consumers owe the government any nominal amount, say, one dollar, the gov-
ernment can raise any amount of revenues it desires in a lump-sum fashion by
making the initial price level low enough. The second step of the perturbation
is to reduce distortionary taxes and thus increase welfare while keeping the
nominal interest rates unchanged from the first step to ensure that the con-
sumers owe the government some nominal amount.
The lemma implies that when the Friedman rule is violated, the nominal
debt must be severely restricted if an interior solution is to exist. For example,
if the Friedman rule does not hold in every period, then the nominal liabilities
must be zero in every period so that (8) holds. We will use this lemma to show
that if the Friedman rule does not hold, the nominal debt is so restricted that
the Ramsey problem cannot be made time consistent. (We later discuss how
this analysis is altered in other common monetary economies.)
2. TIME CONSISTENCY AND THE FRIEDMAN RULE
Now we give a version of Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) definition of time con-
sistency and establish, for our benchmark economy, that the Ramsey problem
is time consistent if and only if the Friedman rule solves the Ramsey problem.
We begin with a definition of time consistency. For convenience, define the
Ramsey problem in period t, given inherited values for money balances Mt−1,
nominal debt Bt−1, and real debt bt−1, to be the problem of choosing allocations
from period t onward, tc, t l, and tm, and the price level pt (by choosing Mt) to
maximize
∞∑
s=t
βs−tU(csms ls)
subject to the resource constraint (1) and the nonnegative interest rate con-
straint (6) for each s ≥ t and the implementability constraint in t,
∞∑
s=t
βs−tRs = −Ult
pt
(
Mt−1 +
∞∑
s=t
QtsBt−1s
)
−
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUlsbt−1s(17)
where Qts =s−1r=t [1 + (Umr/Ulr)].
The Ramsey problem in period t is said to be time consistent for t+1 if values
exist for nominal money balances Mt , nominal debt Bt , and real debt bt that
satisfy two conditions. First, the nominal money balances Mt are consistent
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with the period t allocation in that Mt = ptmt . Second, the continuation of
the Ramsey allocations in period t from t + 1 on—namely, t+1c, t+1m, and t+1l
together with the price level pt+1—solve the Ramsey problem in t + 1, where
the price level pt+1 is a function of the allocations and the nominal money
supply according to
pt+1 = Qtt+1pt
qtt+1
= βUlt+1
Ult
Mt/mt
1 + (Umt/Ult) 
The Ramsey problem in period 0 is time consistent if the Ramsey problem in
period t is time consistent for t + 1 for all t ≥ 0.
Given this definition, the way to establish that a Ramsey problem in, say,
period 0 is time consistent for period 1 is to show how the initial conditions for
the period 1 problem—M0, B0, and b0—can be chosen so as to give incentives
for the government in period 1 to continue with the allocations chosen by the
government in period 0.
To keep the proofs simple, we assume here that the utility function is weakly
increasing in m; hence, we can drop the nonnegative interest rate constraint
in the Ramsey problem. For later use, however, recall from the proof of the
lemma (in the Appendix) that under this assumption, if Um = 0, then
Umm =Umc =Uml = 0(18)
A simple example illustrates the main ideas behind two propositions to
come, Propositions 3 and 4, which give sufficient and necessary conditions un-
der which the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
EXAMPLE: Let the utility function U be additively separable in its three ar-
guments. Let gt be zero in all periods, so that ct = lt . Let initial government
debt have b−10 = b > 0 and be zero in all other periods, and let nominal gov-
ernment debt satisfy (8). For the period 0 Ramsey problem, consider the com-
bined first-order conditions for ct and lt for t ≥ 1,
(1 + λ0)(Uct +Ult)+ λ0ct(Ucct +Ullt)= 0(19)
and the first-order condition for mt for t ≥ 0,
(1 + λ0)Umt + λ0mtUmmt = 0(20)
Clearly, ct and lt are constant for t ≥ 1, and mt is constant for t ≥ 0. It is easy
to show that a constant level of positive taxes is levied in each period t ≥ 1, so
that the sum Uct +Ult > 0 and is constant for each t ≥ 1.
To make this allocation time consistent for period 1, we must be able to
choose new government debt B0t and b0t , new nominal money balances M0,
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES 553
and a new multiplier λ1 that support the continuation of the period 0 alloca-
tions. To be able to do that, these constructed objects must satisfy the first-
order conditions for the Ramsey problem in period 1, that is, the combined
first-order conditions for ct and lt for all t ≥ 1,
(1 + λ1)(Uct +Ult)+ λ1ct(Ucct +Ullt)+ λ1Ulltb0t = 0(21)
and the first-order condition for mt for t ≥ 1,
(1 + λ1)Umt + λ1mtUmmt = 0(22)
We first show that if the Friedman rule holds, then the allocation can be
made time consistent. (By doing so, we highlight some of the key ideas in
Proposition 3, below.) We set M0 + B0t = 0 and B0t = 0 for all t ≥ 1 and con-
struct b0t and λ1 in a way related to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983). Since ct ,
mt , and lt are constant in (21), the level of real government debt b0t does not
vary with t; we denote it by b′. We use (21) to find b′ as a function of λ1:
b′ = −(Uct +Ult)
Ullt
(
1
λ1
)
− Uct +Ucctct +Ult +Ulltlt
Ullt

We then substitute b′ into the period t = 1 implementability constraint to solve
for λ1. Such a λ1 can be found if −(Uct +Ult)/Ullt = 0, a condition that we will
assume in Proposition 3. Finally, we need to verify that the first-order condition
for mt (22) holds for the constructed multiplier λ1. Notice that, if the Friedman
rule holds, then by (18), this equation is satisfied for any λ1. In this sense, when
agents are satiated with money, money disappears from the Ramsey problem.
Second, we show that if the Friedman rule does not hold, then the period 0
Ramsey problem is not time consistent. (By doing so, we highlight some of the
key ideas in Proposition 4, below.) Our lemma implies that if interest rates
are always positive, then the nominal government debt has to be zero in each
period. Motivated by this implication, we suppose here that the new nominal
debt satisfies M0 + B0t = 0 and B0t = 0 for all t ≥ 1. We argue that with these
restrictions on nominal debt, the period 0 allocations cannot be supported. For
t ≥ 1, taxes are levied, and the allocations are constant; hence, b0t is some posi-
tive constant b′ for all t. Comparing the first-order conditions for mt in periods
0 and 1, we conclude that since Umt > 0 for some t ≥ 1, λ1 = λ0. Using this
multiplier, we evaluate the first-order condition of the period 1 problem (21)
at the continuation of the period 0 allocations, which solve (19), to conclude
that for all t ≥ 1,
(1 + λ0)(Uct +Ult)+ λ0ct(Ucct +Ullt)+ λ0Ulltb′ = λ0Ulltb′ < 0
since Ullt is negative and both λ0 and b′ are positive and the rest of the terms
are zero by (19). This inequality means that at the period 0 allocations, the gov-
ernment has an incentive to deviate from the allocations chosen by the period 0
government. Hence, the period 0 Ramsey problem is not time consistent.
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Consider this result at a more abstract level than that simple example. When
the restrictions imposed by the lemma are satisfied, the government in period 0
does not have enough instruments of influence to induce the government in
period 1 to follow the continuation of the Ramsey policy. The government
in period 0 must find a vector of real bonds and a multiplier for the imple-
mentability constraint that satisfy the first-order conditions for consumption
and leisure (21), the first-order conditions for real balances (22), and the im-
plementability constraints of the period 1 government at the period 0 Ramsey
allocation. When the Friedman rule does not hold, in general, no combination
of b′ and λ satisfies all these equations.
We can now use the logic of the example to show that if the Friedman rule
holds, then the Ramsey problem is time consistent. To cover the general case,
we assume that two regularity conditions hold in each period t: Uct +Ult ≥ 0, so
that taxes are nonnegative, and Uclt +Ullt < 0, which is essentially normality of
consumption. (In our working paper, Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002),
we give sufficient conditions for taxes to be nonnegative.)
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the initial nominal government liabilities are all
zero and our regularity conditions hold. If the Friedman rule holds for each period,
then the Ramsey problem in period 0 is time consistent.
The proof is a generalization of that used in the example and is in the Ap-
pendix. Strictly speaking, in the proof of this proposition, we show that if the
maturity structure of the government debt is adequately managed, then the
continuation of the Ramsey allocation in period 0 satisfies the first-order con-
ditions of the Ramsey problem faced by the successor governments. An alloca-
tion that satisfies the first-order conditions may not solve the Ramsey problem;
it could be a local maximum, a minimum, or a saddle point. In our working pa-
per, Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002), we give conditions under which the
first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem are sufficient for a maximum.
The proof of Proposition 3 makes clear that to ensure time consistency,
there is a unique way to restructure the real government debt. In general,
there are many ways to restructure the nominal debt. (See Alvarez, Kehoe,
and Neumeyer (2002) for details.)
We now consider the converse of Proposition 3, that if the Ramsey problem
is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal. We assume the following
regularity condition. At a Ramsey allocation, if the Friedman rule does not
hold for some period t, then
(Rct +Rlt)Ulmt −Rmt(Ulct +Ullt) = 0(23)
holds, where R(cm l)= cUc +mUm + lUl. (This regularity condition ensures
that the first-order conditions for the Ramsey problem are not collinear.) This
regularity condition is satisfied, for example, when the period utility function U
is additively separable in leisure. For such preferences, the left-hand side
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of (23) reduces to −RmtUllt , and the first-order condition (11) implies that
Rmt = −Umt/λ = 0.
We also assume that in period 0 the government’s budget is not balanced, in
that
τ0c0 + (1 −Q01)m0 = g0 + b−10(24)
where Q01 = 1 + (Um0/Ul0) and 1 + τ0 = −Uc0/Ul0.
The proof is a generalization of that used in the example and is in the Ap-
pendix.
PROPOSITION 4: Assume that the government’s initial nominal liabilities are
all zero. Assume also that in some period r, consumption taxes are levied and the
conditions (16) and the regularity condition (23) hold; in all periods, the normality
condition Ulct + Ullt < 0 holds; and in period 0, the government’s budget is not
balanced. If the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then the Friedman rule holds
for each period s ≥ 1.
Note that if, in the period 0 Ramsey problem, the government’s budget is
balanced in every period, then the Ramsey problem can be time consistent
even if interest rates are strictly positive in all periods. For example, consider
an economy in which gt is constant and b−1t = B−1t = 0 for all t, so that there
is no initial government debt. The period 0 Ramsey allocation is constant and
prescribes a balanced budget. The Ramsey problem at any future period is the
same as the period 0 Ramsey problem; thus, its solution is the continuation of
the period 0 solution. Therefore, the period 0 Ramsey problem is time con-
sistent. Nevertheless, the solution of the period 0 Ramsey problem may have
strictly positive interest rates, depending on the preferences. For an example of
such preferences, see the work of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996, p. 209).
Clearly, our results, especially Proposition 4, are at odds with the results of
Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987). They construct a nominal debt vector
to be inherited by the period 1 government and suppose that with this vector as
an initial condition, the period 1 government chooses an interior point for p1,
so that 0 <p1 <∞. As our lemma shows, unless the Friedman rule is satisfied,
the Ramsey problem in period 1 does not have a solution (with an interior
point for p1). Thus, the construction by Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987)
is invalidated by endogenous restrictions on the nominal debt vector that they
do not take into account.
3. INTUITION: COUNTING EQUATIONS AND UNKNOWNS
Whether or not a policy is time consistent depends critically on how many
instruments a government in any period has to influence its successor relative
to how many choices the successor makes. For time consistency, the number of
instruments must be greater than or equal to the number of choices.
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We simplify the counting of instruments and choices by considering a finite
horizon version of our economy with T periods. To mimic the opportunity cost
of holding money in period T that would arise in an infinite horizon economy
from the nominal interest rate between period T and period T + 1, we add a
direct tax on real balances for period T .
We focus on how the government in period 0 can induce the government
in period 1 to carry out the continuation of its plans. We first count the num-
ber of instruments that the period 0 government can use to influence the pe-
riod 1 government. In doing so, we count neither the nominal bonds nor the
money supply. We exclude the nominal bonds because the proofs of Proposi-
tions 3 and 4 indicate that the Ramsey problem is time consistent if and only
if the Ramsey allocations can be supported by the period 0 government giv-
ing the period 1 government zero nominal liabilities in each period by setting
M1 +B01 = 0 and B0t = 0 for all t > 1. (In each period, either Umt > 0 and the
lemma applies, or Umt = 0 and (18) holds. Either way, the terms in the first-
order conditions involving nominal debt drop out.) We do not count the money
supply because the period 0 plan includes M1, so that there is no freedom in
picking this variable. Thus, the only other instruments that the government in
period 0 can use to influence the government in period 1 are the T real bonds
b0t for t = 1     T .
Now we consider the conditions that define the period 1 government choices,
the first-order conditions and the implementability constraint. For t = 1     T
the first-order conditions for ct and lt combined give
Rct +Rlt + (Ulct +Ullt)b0t = −(Uct +Ult)
λ1

while the first-order condition for real balances mt is
Rmt +Ulmtb0t = Umt
λ1
(25)
The implementability constraint is
T∑
t=1
βt−1R(ctmt lt)= −
T∑
t=1
βt−1Ultb0t 
These equations form a linear system in 2T +1 equations and T +1 unknowns,
namely, the T real bonds and the multiplier λ1. This system has (many) more
equations than unknowns.
When the Friedman rule is optimal, Umt = 0, and using either weak separa-
bility or (18), we know that Ulmt = 0, and neither b0t nor λ1 enters (25). Thus,
the linear system reduces to T +1 equations in T +1 unknowns and, under our
regularity conditions, has a unique solution. Thus, here the period 0 govern-
ment has enough instruments to induce the government in period 1 to carry out
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the continuation of its plan. Conversely, if the Ramsey problem is time consis-
tent, then T equations must be redundant. Given our regularity conditions, the
T redundant equations are the first-order conditions for money, which implies
that Umt = 0. Thus, the Friedman rule is optimal.
We have shown that determining whether or not the Ramsey problem is
time consistent can be reduced to counting the number of instruments that the
government of period 0 has to influence the government in period 1 and the
number of conditions that define the choices of the period 1 government and
comparing the two numbers. For time consistency, government 0’s instruments
of influence must be at least as many as government 1’s choices.
Throughout we use the primal approach to analyze the Ramsey problem in
which all the tax rates and interest rates are substituted out. If instead we had
used the dual approach, our counting procedure would be more reminiscent of
that of Tinbergen (1956). We could then compare the number of policies cho-
sen by the government of period 1 to the number of instruments the period 0
government has to influence the period 1 government. The period 1 govern-
ment must choose 2T policies, the T taxes on consumption and T taxes on
real balances (T − 1 nominal interest rates and one direct tax) while the pe-
riod 0 government has effectively only the T real bonds as instruments. When
the Friedman rule is optimal, money effectively disappears, and the period 1
government has only T policies and the period 0 government has sufficiently
many instruments, the T real bonds, to induce its successor to carry out its
plan. When the Friedman rule is not optimal, the period 0 government does
not have enough instruments to do this.
4. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER MONETARY ECONOMIES
Our main result is that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time con-
sistent for an interesting class of economies discussed in Propositions 1–3. The
benchmark economy we have focused on is an economy with money in the util-
ity function, in which end-of-period real money balances enter that function.
Now we show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for
other interesting economies as well, including a version of our economy with
beginning-of-period money balances in the utility function, a cash-credit econ-
omy, and a shopping time economy. For completeness, in Proposition 4, we
have also given necessary conditions for the time consistency of optimal poli-
cies for our benchmark model. Here, we briefly discuss how these necessary
conditions may change in other models.
In our model with end-of-period money balances, increases or decreases in
the price level have no costs other than their effect on the real value of nominal
debt. This makes the time consistency problem severe: if private agents owe the
government even a tiny nominal amount, then the government has an incentive
to engineer a sharp decrease in the price level to greatly increase the real value
of this nominal debt. Even with this severe problem, however, policy is time
consistent in an interesting class of economies.
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In general, as changing the price level ex post becomes either harder or
costlier, the time consistency problem becomes less severe, and the set of cir-
cumstances for which optimal policy is time consistent becomes larger. As an
extreme, consider the example of Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which the gov-
ernment (or “central bank”) can commit to a path for the nominal price level,
so that ex post prices cannot be changed from this path. Then, as Lucas and
Stokey show, optimal policy will always be time consistent, regardless of the
form of preferences. The principle is that, as changing prices ex post becomes
harder, the set of sufficient conditions for time consistency expands and the set
of necessary conditions for time consistency shrinks.
We turn now to showing how that optimal policy will be time consistent for
other commonly used monetary economies.
Beginning-of-Period Real Balances
We start with economies in which the money balances entering a period’s
utility function are those for the beginning of the period rather than the end.
Explicitly, consider a utility function U(ctmt lt), in which now mt = Mt−1/pt
denotes the beginning-of-period real money balances.
The implementability constraint for this economy is
c0Uc0 +Ul0(l0 + b−10)+
∞∑
t=1
βt[ctUct +mtUmt +Ult(lt + b−1t)](26)
= −Ul0
p0
(
M−1 +B−10 +
∞∑
t=1
Q0tB−1t
)
 where
Q0t =
t∏
s=1
(
1 − Ums
Uls
)−1
and p0 =M−1/m0
Notice that here M−1 is a predetermined variable, so that changing p0 neces-
sarily changes m0, while in the end-of-period balances economy p0 = M0/m0,
and both M0 and m0 are choice variables.
Note that the time consistency problem is less severe here than in the bench-
mark economy. The reason is that an increase in the initial price level decreases
the initial real money balances as well as the real value of the nominal debt. To
see this, consider the first-order conditions for p0:
−λ0Ul0
p20
(
M−1 +B−10 +
∞∑
t=1
Q0tB−1t
)
= Um0
p0
m0(27)
where, for notational simplicity, we let U be additively separable in m. The
left side of (27) is the benefit from increasing the price level. Comparing (27)
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with (12) demonstrates that here increasing the price level has an extra cost
coming from the decrease in real money balances captured by the term
Um0m0/p0.
The exact analogs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 hold here. To see this, note that
when the initial nominal government liabilities are all zero, the only difference
between the Ramsey problems of our benchmark economy and this economy
is that the implementability constraint for the benchmark economy, (7), has
the term m0Um0 while the implementability constraint for this economy, (26),
does not. In the economy with beginning-of-period balances and zero nominal
debt in all periods, using (18), we see that setting Um0 = 0 is optimal, regardless
of preferences. The first-order conditions for all other periods are the same in
the two economies.
For this economy, the proof of our lemma does not hold; hence, our proof
of Proposition 4 does not either. Here, in a Ramsey problem, the initial price
level may be interior even if the value of the nominal debt is not zero, as the
first-order condition (27) shows. We conjecture that necessary conditions for
time consistency are much weaker here than for the benchmark economy.
Cash-Credit and Shopping Time Economies
Consider extending our results to two other commonly used economies—
a cash and credit goods economy and a shopping time economy. These
economies can be represented as economies with money in the utility func-
tion, but the assumption that Um ≥ 0 everywhere may well be violated. Note
that Propositions 1 and 2 apply to these economies because in them we do
not require that the utility function be such that Um ≥ 0. Propositions 3 and 4,
however, require a slight modification. Here we discuss the modification to
Proposition 3, and in Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2002), we discuss the
one corresponding to Proposition 4.
Consider an economy with cash and credit goods, similar to that of Lucas and
Stokey (1983). In particular, let the period utility function be h(c1 c2 l), where
c1 and c2 are cash and credit goods and l is labor. Assuming that end-of-period
real balances are exclusively used to purchase cash goods, we can map the
cash-credit economy into our notation by defining U(cm l)= h(mc−m l),
where c = c1 + c2. Notice that even if h is strictly increasing in c1 and c2, the as-
sociated utility function U is typically not weakly increasing in m everywhere,
as we have assumed in Proposition 3. The monotonicity assumption Um ≥ 0,
together with the assumptions of concavity and differentiability, implies that
Umm = 0 whenever Um = 0. For the cash-credit economy, Um = 0 when h1 = h2.
It can be shown that our monotonicity and concavity assumptions require that
at the point where h1 = h2, h11 = h22 = h12, which in turns implies an infinite
elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods, a very special condi-
tion.
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Proposition 3 holds for the cash-credit economy if we add an extra regularity
condition:
Umt = 0 and Ummt < 0 imply that
(Ulct +Ullt)Ummt > Ulmt(Umct +Umlt)
(28)
To understand this condition, define the satiation level of money m∗(c l) to
be the smallest level of real balances for which its marginal utility is zero; that
is, m∗(c l) = min{m :Um(cm l)= 0}. This regularity condition is met if U is
such that m∗(c l) is independent of l and leisure is a normal good. A sufficient
condition for this to be true is that U is weakly separable in l, as in U(cm l)=
u(w(cm) l).
Proposition 3 also holds for a shopping time economy. In this economy, the
regularity condition also holds when U is derived from a shopping time tech-
nology, as in U(cm l) = u(c l + s(cm)), where s is the time an agent that
consumes c and has m real balances needs to devote to shopping and where
the utility u is defined over c and total labor l + s. We then have the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 3′: Assume that the initial nominal claims are zero period by
period, so that (8) holds and our strengthened regularity conditions hold. If the
Friedman rule holds for each period, then the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
The proof uses a construction similar to that of Proposition 3. The only dif-
ference is that now we have to construct ηt , the multiplier on the interest rate
constraint Umt ≥ 0, as well as b0 and λ1. Our extra regularity condition (28) en-
sures that there is a unique solution for b0t and ηt as a function of λ1. We then
substitute the resulting expression for b0t into the implementability constraint,
and under our regularity conditions, there is a unique λ1.
5. RELATING TIME CONSISTENCY TO SUSTAINABLE PLANS
Now we relate Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) notion of time consistency to the
literature on sustainable plans (Chari and Kehoe (1990, 1993)) and thus to the
closely related literature on credible policies (Stokey (1991)). We show that if
the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then its solution is sustainable. More
precisely, we show that the Ramsey allocations and policies are sustainable out-
comes generated by a Markov sustainable equilibrium. Note that the converse
is clearly not true; sustainable outcomes are not typically time consistent.
In the Lucas–Stokey definition of time consistency, which we have used here,
the government in period 0 solves a problem under the presumption that it has
the ability to commit to all its future policies, and consumers act under this
presumption as well. What the government in period 0 actually gets to set,
however, is the period 0 policies, including the new initial conditions for the
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government to face in period 1. The problem in period 0 is time consistent for
the problem in period 1 if initial conditions exist such that the government in
period 1, under a similar presumption about commitment, chooses to continue
with the allocations and policies chosen by the government in period 0. Under
this definition, the government in period 0 does not explicitly think through
how altering the initial conditions for the government of period 1 affects the fu-
ture government’s choices, since the government in period 0 simply presumes
it can commit to all future policies.
The sustainable plan literature takes a lack of commitment as given and ex-
plicitly builds it into the definition of an equilibrium. In this definition, the
government in period 0 realizes both that it cannot commit to all its future
policies and that consumers understand this lack of commitment. This govern-
ment also explicitly thinks through how altering the initial conditions for the
period 1 problem affects the choices of the period 1 government.
In the sustainable equilibrium, the lack of commitment is modeled by having
the government choose policy sequentially. Consumer allocations, prices, and
government policy are specified as functions of the history of past policies of
the government. These functions specify behavior for any possible history, even
for histories in which the government deviates from prescribed behavior.
The time consistent equilibrium, in contrast, simply specifies a sequence of
allocations, prices, and policies and thus is not directly comparable to a sustain-
able equilibrium. Along the equilibrium path, however, a sustainable equilib-
rium generates a particular sequence of allocations, prices, and policies, called
a sustainable outcome, which is comparable to the sequences specified by a time
consistent equilibrium.
For a version of the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy without money, Chari
and Kehoe (1993) show that the sustainable outcome generated by a Markov
sustainable equilibrium solves a simple programming problem. With a little
work, their results can be extended to our economy, and it can be shown that
for some given initial conditions M−1, B−1, and b−1, the allocations (0c, 0m, 0l)
are sustainable Markov allocations if and only if they are part of the solution to
the following programming problem: Choose allocations (0c, 0m, 0l), a nominal
money supply M0, and nominal and real government debt B0 and b0 to solve
the sustainable Markov problem
V0(M−1B−1 b−1)= max
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ctmt lt)(29)
subject to the resource constraint and the nonnegative interest rate constraint
for t ≥ 0, the implementability constraint for t = 0
∞∑
t=0
βtRt = −Ul0
p0
(
M−1 +
∞∑
t=0
Q0tB−1t
)
−
∞∑
t=0
βtUltb−1t
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and for t = 1
∞∑
t=1
βt−1Rt = −Ul1
p1
(
M0 +
∞∑
t=1
Q1tB0t
)
−
∞∑
t=1
βt−1Ultb0t(30)
and the sustainability constraint for all t > 0
∞∑
s=t
βs−tU(ctmt lt)≥ Vt(Mt−1Bt−1 bt−1)(31)
where Q0t = t−1s=0[1 + (Ums/Uls)] and p1 = M1/m1 and the value functions
Vt(Mt−1Bt−1 bt−1) are defined recursively by (29). The sustainability con-
straint (31) captures the restriction that whatever sequence of allocations from
period 0 to infinity is contemplated by the government in period 0, given the
state variables (M0B1 b1) that this government passes to the government in
period 1, the government in period 1 has an incentive to implement the contin-
uation of these allocations from period 1 onward. The government in period 1
faces a similar constraint with respect to the government in period 2, and so
on, for the governments in all future periods.
Notice that the sustainable Markov problem is essentially the Ramsey prob-
lem in period 0 with two extra constraints: the implementability constraint
in period 1 and the sustainability constraint with extra choice variables
(M0B0 b0) and p1. From the definition of time consistency and the sustain-
able Markov problem, we have this proposition:
PROPOSITION 5: If the Ramsey problem is time consistent, then the Ramsey
allocations are Markov sustainable allocations.
PROOF: Our previous propositions contain the essence of the proof. Let
V R0 (M−1B−1, b−1) denote the value of the Ramsey problem in period 0 with
state variables (M−1, B−1 b−1). Since the Ramsey problem is a less constrained
version of the sustainable Markov problem, its value is necessarily higher, so
that
V R0 (M−1B−1 b−1)≥ V0(M−1B−1 b−1)
Thus, if the Ramsey allocations are feasible for the sustainable Markov prob-
lem, then they necessarily solve it. So, consider the Ramsey allocations given
the state variables (M−1B−1 b−1). These allocations clearly satisfy the re-
source constraint and the implementability constraint in period 0 in the
sustainable Markov problem. Given the values for the new state variables
(M0B0 b0) constructed as in the definition of time consistency, these state
variables plus the continuation of the period 0 allocations clearly satisfy the re-
maining constraints of the sustainable Markov problem—the implementability
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constraint in period 1, by construction, and the sustainability constraint, since
by the same logic as that of period 0, it follows that
V R1 (M0B0 b0)≥ V1(M0B0 b0) Q.E.D.
Here we have shown the connection between the concepts of time consis-
tency and sustainable plans for a class of economies. A similar connection
should hold for other economies as well.
6. CONCLUSION
In a simple economy similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983), we have
found that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent if and only
if the Friedman rule is optimal in this economy. The key ideas behind this
result are three: (i) A government has little freedom in using nominal debt to
influence successor governments; the primary influence comes, instead, from
the appropriate setting of real debt. (ii) When the Friedman rule is not optimal,
no government has enough free debt instruments to adequately control the
incentives of its successor to carry out its plan. When the Friedman rule is
optimal, the government has no desire to use one of its taxes, the nominal
interest rate, but the free debt instrument, real debt, is rich enough to control
the incentives of the successor government in setting the remaining tax, the
consumption tax. (iii) The Friedman rule is optimal for preferences that are
widely used in applied work. Hence, this study suggests that, in practice, the
type of time consistency problem considered here can be adequately solved by
a careful management of government debt.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 1, 2, 3, AND 4 AND THE LEMMA
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Assume, by way of contradiction, that Umt > 0. We can arrange
the first-order conditions for consumption ct and real money balances mt to be
(1 + λ)+ λ
(
Ucctct +Ucmtmt
Uct
)
+ λ(lt + b−1t)Ulct
Uct
= γt
Uct
(A.1)
(1 + λ)+ λ
(
Ucmtct +Ummtmt
Umt
)
+ λ(lt + b−1t)Ulmt
Umt
= 0(A.2)
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Differentiating (13) with respect to α and evaluating it at α= 1 gives that
ctUcmt +mtUmmt
Umt
= ctUcct +mtUcmt
Uct
(A.3)
By weak separability, Ulct/Uct = Ulmt/Umt . Subtracting (A.1) from (A.2) using (A.3) and weak
separability gives that γt/Uct = 0, which is a contradiction since γt and Uct are strictly posi-
tive. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: We prove here that the Friedman rule solves the Ramsey problem
under the conditions of Proposition 2 by showing that under our hypotheses, we can construct a
solution to the first-order conditions and the implementability constraint that satisfies the Fried-
man rule.
Define the satiation level of money m∗(c l) to be the smallest level of real balances for which
its marginal utility is zero; that is, m∗(c l) = min{m : Um(cm l) = 0}. As a preliminary result,
we show that this satiation level m∗(c l)= cg(l) for some positive and increasing function g(l)
and that at that satiation level,
Umc +Ummg(l)= 0 and Ummcg′(l)+Uml = 0(A.4)
To see this, note that if Um(αcαm l)= 0 for all α, we can set α = 1/c and define m∗ implicitly
as Um(1m∗(c l)/c l) = 0. Clearly, m∗ is of the form cg(l). Differentiating Um(c cg(l) l) = 0
with respect to c and with respect to m gives (A.4). To see that g is increasing, notice that if
Umm < 0, then Uml ≥ 0 if and only if g′(l) ≥ 0. If Umm = 0 at the point where Um = 0, as in (18),
then Umc =Uml = 0.
We establish our result by constructing an allocation that solves the first-order conditions of the
Ramsey problem in the monetary economy using the first-order conditions for a corresponding
real economy. To do so, define U¯(c l)=U(cm∗(c l) l), and define the Ramsey problem for the
corresponding real economy as choosing {ct lt} to maximize ∑βtU¯(ct lt) subject to ct + gt = lt
and the implementability constraint
∞∑
t=0
βt [U¯ct ct + U¯lt (lt + b−1t)] = 0(A.5)
Denote the solution as {c∗t  l∗t } and the multipliers for the resource constraints and the imple-
mentability constraints as {γ∗t } and λ∗.
For the corresponding monetary economy, we need to define the multiplier on the constraint
Umt ≥ 0. Let this multiplier be given by
η∗t = λ∗ml(c∗t  l∗)(l∗t + b−1t)(A.6)
Notice that η∗t ≥ 0 since l∗t + b−1t ≥ 0ml(c∗t  l∗) = c∗t g′(l∗t ) ≥ 0, and λ∗ ≥ 0. Let m∗t =m∗(c∗t  l∗t ).
We claim that {c∗t m∗t  l∗t } and the multipliers λ∗ and {γ∗t  η∗t } solve the first-order conditions and
the implementability constraint of the Ramsey problem in the monetary economy. Clearly, the
allocation is resource feasible. It remains to be shown that the first-order conditions with respect
to mt ct , and lt as well as the implementability constraint are satisfied.
We now show that the first-order condition for money
(1 + λ∗)Umt + λ∗[Umctc∗t +Ummtm∗t +Umlt(l∗t + b−1t)] +η∗t Ummt = 0(A.7)
holds at the constructed allocations and multipliers. At our constructed allocation, Umt = 0.
Multiplying the first equality in (A.4) by λ∗c∗t and using the definition of m
∗, we get that
λ∗(Umctc∗t +Ummtm∗t )= 0. Using (A.4) to solve for Umlt and the definition of η∗t , we get that
λ(l∗t + b−1t )Umlt +η∗t Ummt =Ummt[−λ∗(l∗t + b−1t)c∗t g′(l∗t )+η∗t ]
Hence, the first-order condition for mt holds.
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The first-order condition with respect to ct in the real economy is that
(1 + λ∗)U¯ct + λ∗[U¯cctc∗t + U¯clt (l∗t + b−1t)] = γ∗t (A.8)
Using the definition of U¯ and the form of m∗ and evaluating the derivatives at the candidate
allocation, we have that U¯c =Uc U¯cc =Ucc +Ucmmc , and U¯cl =Ucl +Umlmc . From (A.4), we get
that Umlmc =Umcml . Using all of these expressions and the definition of η∗t , we get this:
(1 + λ∗)Uct + λ∗(Ucctc∗t +Ucmtm∗t )+ λ∗Uclt(l∗t + b−1t)+ λ∗η∗t = γ∗t 
which is the first-order condition for ct in the monetary economy. An analogous argument holds
for the first-order conditions with respect to lt . Finally, from m∗t =m(c∗t  l∗t ), U¯ct =Uct  U¯lt =Ult ,
and Umt = 0, it is immediate that the implementability constraint in the real economy implies the
implementability constraint in the monetary economy. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA: We prove the lemma by showing that if the assumptions of the lemma
hold and (15) does not hold, then we can perturb the allocations and increase utility.
We construct the perturbation in two steps. In the first step, we perturb the allocation in order
to make the present value of the government’s nominal liabilities negative and then lower the
initial price level. If Qss+1 < 1 and (14) holds but (15) does not, then we can make the present
value of the government’s nominal liabilities negative by a small change in Qss+1. This change,
which may entail either raising or lowering Qss+1, is feasible since the Friedman rule does not
hold at s. We change csms, and ls in a way that satisfies the resource constraint and produces the
desired change in Qss+1. Then, by lowering the initial price level p0, we can generate any desired
level of real assets for the government.
In the second step of the perturbation, we lower the taxes in period r, the period that we have
hypothesized has positive taxes, in a way that raises utility in that period, satisfies the resource
constraint, and holds fixed Qrr+1, so that we know that the perturbed allocation still implies a
strictly negative value for nominal government liabilities and the first step of the perturbation
still works. To that end, note that positive taxes in period r imply that −Ulr < Ucr . Since Umr ≥ 0,
we can increase cr and mr and decrease lr in a way that keepsQrr+1 constant, satisfies the resource
constraint, and increases utility in period r. Clearly, by the implicit function theorem, for a fixed
Qrr+1 and gr , functions m(c) and l(c) exist such that c, m(c), and l(c) satisfy
Um(cm(c) l(c))+ (1 −Qrr+1)Ul(cm(c) l(c))= 0(A.9)
and c + gr = l(c). These functions satisfy l′(c)= 1, and if Um > 0, then
m′(c)= −
[
Umc +Uml + (1 −Qrr+1)(Ull +Ulc)
Umm + (1 −Qrr+1)Ulm
]
(A.10)
which is nonnegative under our assumptions on second derivatives. (Note that since Umm ≤ 0, the
denominator in (A.10) is nonpositive even if Ulm > 0, because Umm +Ulm < 0 and 1−Qrr+1 ≤ 1)
If Um > 0, then increasing c, and thus changing m and l by m′(c) and l′(c), leads utility in
period r to change by Uc + Ul + Umm′(c), which is strictly positive since by assumption at r,
−Ul < Uc , Um ≥ 0, and m′(c)≥ 0.
If Um = 0, it must be that Qrr+1 = 1. Consider the case where Umm < 0. To ensure that (A.9)
holds, it is enough to let m′(c)= −(Umc +Uml)/Umm > 0. In this case, the resulting change in util-
ity in period r is Uc +Ul > 0. If at some point Um = 0 and Umm = 0, by concavity it must be that
Uml = Ucm = 0 at this point as well. (To see this, note that if Um = 0 at some point m, then since
U is weakly increasing in m, Um = 0 at all points m′ ≥m. Thus, since U is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, Umm = 0. To see that Umc = 0, note that by concavity UccUmm −U2mc ≥ 0, so Umc = 0.
A similar argument applies for Uml) Hence, a small change in c and l does not change the value
of Um , and in particular, this change keeps Um = 0. Thus, increasing c and l by the same small
amount changes the period r utility by Uc +Ul > 0. This establishes the contradiction. Q.E.D.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Now we prove that if the Friedman rule holds under the conditions
of Proposition 3, then the Ramsey problem is time consistent.
We begin this proof by showing that the Ramsey problem for period 0 is time consistent for
period 1 by constructing the appropriate initial conditions for the period 1 Ramsey problem,
namely, M0, B0, and b0 together with a period 1 multiplier λ1, so that the first-order conditions
and the implementability constraint for the period 1 Ramsey problem hold when evaluated at the
continuation of the period 0 Ramsey allocations. For the nominal assets, we set M0 + B00 = 0
and B0t = 0 for t ≥ 1. (The breakdown of M0 and B00 is irrelevant as long as M0 > 0.)
We construct the values for b0 and λ1 in a way similar to that of Lucas and Stokey (1983). Con-
sider the combined first-order conditions for ct and lt from (9) and (10), which can be rewritten as
b0t = −
(
1
λ1
)
(Uct +Ult)
(Ulct +Ullt ) −
(Rct +Rlt )
(Ulct +Ullt ) 
which gives our expression for b0t for an arbitrary λ1. To construct λ1, we substitute this expres-
sion for b0t into the period 1 implementability constraint. Given our assumptions, the fraction
(Uct +Ult)/(Ulct +Ullt ) is negative, and there is a unique solution for λ1.
It remains to be shown that the first-order conditions for mt in the period 1 problem
Umt + λ1Rmt = −λ1Ulmtb0t(A.11)
hold. Since Umt = 0, it follows from (18) that Rmt = Umt + ctUcmt + mtUmmt + ltUmlt = 0. Since
both sides of (A.11) are identically zero regardless of the multiplier, these first-order conditions
trivially hold. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: We show here that under the stated conditions, if the Ramsey
problem is time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal. We prove this proposition by show-
ing that if the Friedman rule does not hold in some period s ≥ 1, then the Ramsey problem is not
time consistent. By way of contradiction, suppose that the Friedman rule does not hold in s ≥ 1,
but the Ramsey problem is time consistent. We show that this implies that in period 0, the Ram-
sey allocation’s first-order conditions for the period 1 problem cannot hold, thus establishing a
contradiction.
We first show that all the terms involving the nominal government liabilities in the first-order
conditions for the period 1 problem are zero. Consider the first-order conditions with respect to
ct and lt in the period 1 Ramsey problem. We claim that in any period t ≥ 1, terms of the form
Q0t
∂Qtt+1
∂ct
∞∑
v=t+1
Qt+1vB−1v = 0(A.12)
Suppose initially that t is some period in which the Friedman rule holds. Then Umt = 0, and
from (18) we know that ∂Qtt+1/∂ct = (UmctUlt −UlctUmt)/U2lt = 0, where we have used Qtt+1 =
1 + (Umt/Ult). A similar argument implies that ∂Qtt+1/∂lt = 0; hence, the corresponding terms
are also zero under the first-order conditions for lt . Suppose next that t is a period, like period s,
in which the Friedman rule does not hold; then (15) does hold, and these terms are zero as well.
Moreover, for the period 1 problem, the first-order condition with respect to p1 implies that
terms of the form (M0 +∑∞t=0 Q1tB0t)/p1 = 0.
We now show that the multipliers on the implementability constraints for the Ramsey problems
in periods 0 and 1, λ0 and λ1, satisfy λ0 = λ1. To see this, consider the first-order conditions to
these problems for period s. From (8) we know that B−1t is zero for all t ≥ 1. The first-order
condition for ms has the form of (11), which can be written as
Rmsλ0 +Ulmsλ0b−1s = −Ums(A.13)
Combining the first-order conditions for cs and ls gives that
(Rcs +Rls)λ0 + (Ulcs +Ulls)λ0b−1s = −Ucs −Uls(A.14)
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We can regard (A.13) and (A.14) as a system of two linear equations in two unknowns, λ0 and
λ0b−1s. For the period 1 Ramsey problem, Ums > 0 for some s ≥ 1. Our lemma implies that∑∞
t=s Q1tB0t is zero, so that the first-order conditions for the period 1 problem can be written as
Rmsλ1 +Ulmsλ1b0s = −Ums(A.15)
(Rcs +Rls)λ1 + (Ulcs +Ulls)λ1b0s = −Ucs −Uls(A.16)
which is a system of linear equations in the two unknowns λ1 and λ1b0s. By hypothesis, the
Ramsey problem is time consistent; hence, the allocations in the two systems of equations
(A.13)–(A.14) and (A.15)–(A.16) are the same. Our regularity condition (23) implies that there
is a unique solution to both and, hence, that λ0 = λ1.
Now we will show that there is some period T for which b0T = b−1T . By way of contradiction,
suppose not. Since the solution to the Ramsey problem in period 1 is interior, the first-order
condition for p1 implies that
λ1
p1
(
M0 +
∞∑
t=1
Q1tB0t
)
= 0(A.17)
Subtracting the product of β and the period 1 implementability constraint from the period 0
implementability constraint gives Ucc0 +Um0m0 +Ul0l0 = −Ul0b−10, which implies that the bud-
get must be balanced in period 0. This is a contradiction. Hence, there must be some period T
for which b0T = b−1T . Using λ1 = λ0 and b0T = b−1T , evaluate the first-order condition for the
period 1 problem in T for the period 0 allocation. That gives
(RcT +RlT )λ1 + (UlcT +UllT )λ1b0T = −UcT −UlT (A.18)
where we have used the assumption that UlcT +UllT < 0. Thus, the continuation of the period 0
allocation cannot solve the period 1 problem. Hence, the Ramsey problem is not time consis-
tent. Q.E.D.
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